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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic quickly engulfed the European Union’s economy in 2020. As
investors sought safe assets, marketable debt yields rose dramatically. To lower the cost of
borrowing, the European Central Bank (ECB), alongside the 19 national central banks (NCBs)
that comprise the Eurosystem, purchased marketable debt in secondary markets. Asset
eligibility mirrored that of the ECB’s Asset Purchase Program (APP), an ongoing quantitative
easing program which the ECB expanded during the pandemic. The main difference was that
the PEPP allowed debt issued by Greece, which did not have an investment-grade credit
rating. The rate that the PEPP purchased securities within each asset class could also vary,
unlike the APP. When the ECB announced the PEPP on March 27, 2020, it approved EUR 750
billion (USD 825 billion) in total purchases to wind down no later than December 2020. The
ECB expanded the program twice to allow EUR 1.85 trillion in asset purchases through
March 2022. As of February 2022, the ECB and NCBs had purchased a total of EUR 1.6 trillion
in assets through the program. The PEPP’s effects in the months after the pandemic outbreak
were difficult to disentangle from the concurrent APP except that the ECB was able to close
yield spreads between German and Greek debt. Debt yields stabilized shortly after the
PEPP’s establishment and the APP’s expansion.
Keywords: APP, CBSPP, COVID-19 pandemic, European Central Bank, European Union,
market liquidity, PEPP, PSPP

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering market support programs in response to COVID-19. Cases are available from the Journal
of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Overview
The spread of COVID-19, and public health
measures designed to contain it, shattered
market confidence in March 2020. Investors
sought riskless assets, pushing up yields as
liquidity evaporated throughout the financial
system (Lane 2020a).

Key Terms

On March 18, 2020, the ECB responded by
unveiling the Pandemic Emergency Purchase
Programme (PEPP) (ECB 2020e). Under the
PEPP, the ECB and 19 national central banks
(NCBs; collectively, the Eurosystem3)
purchased securities issued in the eurozone
or secured by eurozone assets and held them
to maturity. It followed the structure and
eligibility criteria of the ECB’s Asset Purchase
Programme (APP), which coordinated four
subsidiary programs: the Covered Bond
Purchase Programme (CBPP); the Public
Sector Securities Purchase Programme
(PSPP); the Asset-Backed Securities Purchase
Programme (ABSPP); and the Corporate
Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) (ECB
2021b). The APP was created to conduct
quantitative easing as the Euro Crisis
threatened deflation in the eurozone
(ECB/2020/9 2020, preamble, para. 6). Then,
the purpose of the APP was to anchor asset
prices and sustain the markets (Blot, Creel,
and Hubert 2020). In each program, the 19
NCBs joined the ECB in purchasing securities
(ECB 2021b). Additionally, Each NCB
purchased the sovereign debt of its member
state.

Launch dates

Announced: March 18,
2020

Operational date

March 26, 2020

Wind-down dates

Projected March 2022

Legal authority

Statute of ESCB, article
18.1; Decision
2020/440 of the ECB

Source of funding

Created reserves

Overall size

EUR 1.85 trillion

Purchased assets

Public-sector securities
issued by governments
and international
financial institutions
based in the eurozone:
covered bonds,
corporate debt,
commercial paper,
asset-backed securities,
all in the secondary
market with remaining
maturities of between
70 days and 31 years

Notable features

EUR 1.65 trillion on
February 4, 2021

Purpose: “address the risk of market fragmentation
[in bond markets,] impairment to monetary policy
transmission [and] ease the monetary policy stance
in light of the contraction that resulted from COVID19” (Lagarde 2020b, 4)

The first component of the APP, the CBPP,
began in 2009; since 2014, CBPP3 had purchased covered bonds and multi cédulas
(ECB/2020/8 2020, art. 3.3) (See Smith [2020a] for a review of CBPP1 and CBPP2). Later in
2014, central banks began purchasing asset-backed securities under the ABSPP
(ECB/2014/45 2015, art. 1). Early 2015 saw the introduction of the PSPP, which bought
In 2020, the 19 Eurosystem members were Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and
Spain.
3
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sovereign debt issued by governments and international financial institutions based in the
eurozone (ECB/2020/9 2020). Last, the CSPP bought investment-grade debt issued by
entities not eligible under the other programs beginning in 2016 (ECB/2016/16 2016). Each
program’s timeline is shown in Figure 1. The Securities Markets Programme (SMP)
purchased bonds from the governments of the eurozone’s weakest economies; the SMP
concluded before the APP’s current subsidiary programs had begun (Benigno et al. 2020, 7;
see Smith 2020b).
Figure 1: Phase-in and -out of ECB asset purchase programs

Source: ECB 2021b.

These programs, except the ABSPP, continued to purchase their holdings of securities
throughout the COVID-19 pandemic (ECB 2020a). When COVID-19 struck, the Governing
Council of the ECB—composed of the heads of the ECB and NCBs (European Union 1992, art.
14)—opted to create a new program instead of extending and enlarging the APP. Though the
PEPP purchased virtually the same assets as the APP, it gave the Eurosystem more flexibility
in allocating funds and a wider range of maturities it could purchase. The ability to tweak the
PEPP’s portfolio was important because the COVID-19 crisis brought more uncertainty than
did the period following the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) (Blot, Creel, and Hubert 2020). As
COVID-19 first spread in March 2020, the ECB was not confident it knew what risks lay
ahead. Officials worried that the pandemic would affect each country’s health system and
economy differently and create further financial turbulence (Lane 2020a). This worry
contrasted with policymakers’ preoccupation with disinflation across the eurozone
following the GFC. Both programs served the ECB’s price-stability mandate, but they fought
price-stability threats from different directions.
Assets eligible for the PEPP expanded upon the APP in two key ways. First, the PEPP could
purchase debt issued or guaranteed by Greece even if Greece’s credit rating was below the
PEPP’s standards for public-sector securities. In the period that followed, the spread

1571

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 2

between Greek and German yields fell to its lowest level since 2008, before Greece faced the
sovereign debt and eurozone crises (OECD 2007–2021). Second, the PEPP could purchase
securities with remaining maturities as short as 70 days—28 days for commercial paper—
and up to six months. This widened the pool of securities eligible for purchase beyond that
of the APP, though its effects have not been well studied. The remaining eligibility criteria
were unchanged from those of the APP (ECB, n.d.).
The PEPP required enormous resources to accomplish such goals. Its announcement carried
a EUR 750 billion (USD 825 billion)4 authority, but, as the pandemic continued to harm
economies, the Governing Council extended the timeframe for purchases and reinvestments
and increased its overall authority, first to EUR 1.35 trillion and then to EUR 1.85 trillion
(ECB 2020f; ECB 2021f). To avoid the sort of unexpected liquidity fluctuations the PEPP was
meant to prevent, the Eurosystem purchased securities at a constant pace. As of February
2022, the Eurosystem had purchased EUR 1.65 trillion of PEPP securities (see Figure 2) (ECB
2020a). When the ECB expanded the PEPP’s size, it also extended its timeframe. From an
initial end date in December 2020, the ECB settled on March 2022 for its final purchases,
with dividends reinvested until end-2023 (ECB 2020e).

4

USD 1 = EUR 0.91 during March 2020.
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Figure 2: Liquidity Provided by the Eurosystem, 2020–2021

Source: ECB 2020a.

Summary Evaluation
Literature on the PEPP continued to evolve as of October 2021. The waiver allowing Greek
debt proved controversial and consequential. Politically, it risked legal challenges along the
same lines as the objections lobbed at the PSPP since 2015 (Grund 2020). Economically, it
whittled Greek and German debt yields to pre-GFC spreads (Blot, Creel, and Hubert 2020;
OECD 2007–2021).
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Context: Eurozone 2019–2020

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

$13,413.8 billion in 2019
$13,021.2 billion in 2020
$39,189 in 2019
$37,968 in 2020

Size of banking system
Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance

Not applicable; ratings applied to
each country’s debt
Not available in 2019
Not available in 2020
Not available in 2019
Not available in 2020
Not available in 2019
Not available in 2020
Not available in 2019
Not available in 2020
Not available in 2019
Not available in 2020
Not available in 2019
Not available in 2020
Country-level insurance, but none
EU-wide in 2019
Country-level insurance, but none
EU-wide in 2020

Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The PEPP was designed to support monetary policy transmission and
prevent market fragmentation in the eurozone.
The press release announcing the PEPP cited “the serious risks to the monetary policy
transmission and the outlook for the euro area posed by the outbreak and escalating
diffusion of the coronavirus” (ECB 2020e). With the PEPP, the ECB gave itself the ability to
purchase Greek sovereign debt and assets at very short and long maturities. PEPP purchases
of a country’s sovereign debt could also exceed limits the ECB set in the Eurosystem “capital
key.” This flexibility was absent in the APP and was the reason the PEPP was created.
Flexibility was required because of the uncertainty caused by COVID-19 and because of
differences in eurozone economies that the APP was not equipped to address. Researchers
had warned about market fragmentation—in which credit access diverged across eurozone
countries, increasing spreads between fundamentally similar assets and threatening the
transmission of ECB monetary policy—several years before the PEPP’s announcement
(Berenberg-Gossler et al. 2016). ECB President Christine Lagarde (2020a; 2020b; 2020c)
said that COVID-19 caused worries over fragmentation to spread. The PEPP could respond
to fragmentation in particular markets by varying purchases across maturities and asset
classes. The program could also target differences between eurozone economies by
purchasing relatively more or less of a country’s debt.
As shown in Figure 3, investors fled the assets of weaker eurozone economies in favor of
stronger ones as COVID-19 erupted. Investors’ flight-to-safety during a crisis like the
pandemic has a “geographic dimension” because the European monetary union lacked a
common safe asset (Lane 2020a). Yields on lower-rated eurozone sovereigns, such as Greece,
ticked up as a result, while yields on higher-rated eurozone sovereigns, such as Germany,
remained stable.
The PEPP’s general strategy as a large-scale asset purchase program relied on the theory that
yields would fall if all else were held equal, and that this demand would spill over into other
markets, lowering yields across markets (Benigno et al. 2020). The PEPP also made
securities available for lending, allowing the Eurosystem to create a market in securities if
private markets suffered dislocations (ECB 2021e; ECB/2020/17 2020, art. 7). Both of these
features were shared with the APP. However, the goals of the PEPP and APP were different.
While the ECB set up the APP to conduct quantitative easing and fight persistent deflationary
forecasts for the eurozone, it set up the PEPP to address the risk of fire sales as investors
rushed to sell assets during a calamitous moment, according to a member of the ECB’s
Executive Board (Blot, Creel, and Hubert 2020; Lane 2020a).
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Figure 3: Ten-year Government Bond Spreads for Eurozone Countries, Monthly Data

Source: OECD 2007–2021.

2. Part of a Package: The PEPP was joined by an expansion of the APP and changes to
other programs.
In March 2020, the ECB also announced that it would expand the APP in light of the
pandemic, making non-financial commercial paper eligible for purchase (Lane 2020b).
Outside of market liquidity programs, the ECB reactivated currency swap lines with the
Federal Reserve, which were a key piece of its response to the Global Financial Crisis (Runkel
2022b). And the ECB expanded other lending programs such as its open-market operations
and Targeted Longer Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs).
3. Legal Authority: A decision issued by the ECB’s Governing Council authorized the
PEPP.
Decision 2020/440 of the ECB established the PEPP on March 26, 2020 (ECB/2020/17 2020,
art. 8). The preamble of this decision outlined the reasons the Governing Council established
the PEPP as well as the reasons for the waiver for Greek debt. The decision was short and
relied heavily on terms and procedures defined in decisions that authorized the
subprograms of the APP:
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•

ECB/2020/9 refining the terms and eligibility of the PSPP;

•

ECB/2016/16 establishing the CSPP;

•

ECB/2020/8 refining the terms and eligibility of the CBPP3;

•

ECB/2014/45 establishing the ABSPP.

The purchases described in the PEPP decision were consistent with the ECB’s authority
under the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank
(Statute of the ESCB). Specifically, the ECB and national central banks could
operate in the financial markets by buying and selling outright (spot and forward) or
under repurchase agreement and by lending or borrowing claims and marketable
instruments, whether in Community or in non-Community currencies, as well as
precious metals. (European Union 1992, sec. 18.1)
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union let the Governing Council issue this
decision (TFEU [1957] 2012, vol. 326/1, sec. 132[2]). The power to issue decisions without
further approval became important as the ECB expanded the PEPP’s size.
The PEPP decision interacted with several EU treaties, specifically those prohibiting the ECB
from engaging in monetary financing.5 As of August 2021, no challenges to the PEPP had
been referred to EU courts, but active cases6 against the PSPP would likely impact the PEPP
as well given that the PEPP relied on the PSPP to define eligible securities.
4. Governance: The Governing Council authorized the PEPP, requiring the ECB to
disclose the PEPP’s holdings weekly.
The decision that created the PEPP was passed by the Governing Council of the ECB, which
consisted of the governor of each NCB and the six-member ECB Executive Board: the
President, Vice-President, and four other members7 (European Union 1992, secs. 10–11).

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ([1957] 2012, art. 123[2]) defined monetary financing
as a “credit facility . . . in favour of . . . central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other
bodies as governed by public law, or . . . the purchase directly from them . . . of debt instruments.”
6 These claims were not trivial matters because of legal challenges brought earlier against the Outright
Monetary Transactions and the PSPP (Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag 2015; Weiss and Others
v. ECB 2018). In these cases, which eventually made their way to the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU), plaintiffs argued that the program in question either exceeded the ECB’s price-stability mandate, its
ability to execute that mandate, or its prohibition on monetary financing (Grund 2020). And, in each, German
courts referred the cases to the CJEU, which had sole authority to interpret “legal acts by EU institutions based
on EU law” (Grund 2020). Grund (2020) interpreted CJEU rulings to say that the programs were legal under EU
law so long as the programs remained compliant with the ECB’s mandate, proportionate to the objectives, and
compatible with the prohibition of monetary financing.
5

In 2020, the President was Christine Lagarde, the Vice President was Luis de Guindos, and the four other
members were Philip R. Lane, Isabel Schnabel, Fabio Panetta, and Frank Elderson.
7
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The decision establishing the PEPP required the ECB to publish the aggregate book value
every week, the net and cumulative net purchases each month, and the book value of
securities held each week (ECB/2020/17 2020, art. 6).
5. Administration: The ECB Executive Board allotted monthly purchases, and
Eurosystem central banks purchased securities.
The Governing Council delegated authority to the Executive Board to “set the appropriate
pace and composition of PEPP monthly purchases” (ECB/2020/17 2020, art. 5). The
Executive Board could choose from which asset classes and countries the PEPP purchased.
All Eurosystem8 central banks purchased PEPP securities—including public-sector
securities of their respective member states—and no documents indicate that central banks
employed outside firms to evaluate assets.
6. Communication: The ECB revealed the PEPP after remarks by the ECB President
drove sovereign-debt yields up.
Before the PEPP was announced, ECB President Christine Lagarde (2020) said that the
Governing Council was “not here to close spreads.” Yields on eurozone debt spiked after the
comment, with the lowest-rated eurozone sovereigns seeing the largest spikes in volatility
and yield (Reuters 2020; OECD 2007–2021). Lagarde walked back the point later, saying that
the central bank was “fully committed to [avoiding] any fragmentation” (Reuters 2020). A
report to the European Parliament stated that it was “reasonable to think that the
implementation of this program was, if not due to, at least brought forward because of
President Lagarde’s comment” (Blot, Creel, and Hubert 2020). Markets also appeared to
react to the announcement of the PEPP, as the volatility of sovereign debt—shown in Figure
4—fell for many eurozone bonds (Blot, Creel, and Hubert 2020). The ECB’s initial
announcements consisted of press releases, its decisions in the Official Journal of the
European Union, and press conferences to explain the terms of the PEPP and its purpose.
Other PEPP communications did not appear to cause explosive effects on markets. ECB
Executive Board members explained the PEPP in virtual speeches and in the ECB’s blog
(Schnabel 2021; Lane 2020a). These platforms also allowed policymakers to describe the
program’s activities.

In 2020, the Eurosystem included the central banks of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, and Spain. The countries with representation in the Eurosystem are referred to as the euro area (EA)
or eurozone.
8
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Figure 4: Sovereign-Debt Volatility and Eurozone Developments

Source: Blot, Creel, and Hubert 2020, 13.

7. Disclosure: The ECB exceeded the required disclosures, publishing updated PEPP
usage data daily on its website.
The decision establishing the PEPP required the ECB to publish the aggregate book value
every week, the net and cumulative net purchases each month, and the book value of
securities held each week (ECB/2020/17 2020, art. 6). The ECB exceeded those
requirements by publishing every other month holdings by asset class and, for the PSPP,
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holdings by issuer (ECB 2020b). These disclosures were not required by the ECB decision
creating the PEPP or by any legislation.
8. Use of SPV: The PEPP did not feature a special purpose vehicle.
The PEPP did not use an SPV to administer its purchases.
9. Size: The Governing Council increased the PEPP’s authority twice, to EUR 1.85
trillion, due to the continuation of the pandemic and its economic effects on the
European countries.
The ECB’s original decision authorized EUR 750 billion for PEPP (ECB/2020/17 2020, art.
1). After it became clear that the pandemic would continue to harm European economies,
inflation projections fell (ECB 2021f). In June 2020, the ECB (ECB 2020f) expanded PEPP to
EUR 1.35 trillion to boost the effects of its accommodative monetary policy. In March 2021,
the ECB expanded PEPP to EUR 1.85 trillion and committed to speeding up purchases (ECB
2021f). In implementing this policy, NCBs bought securities gradually rather than all at once.
Prior APP procedures suggest that “Eurosystem staff regularly assessed bond market
liquidity indicators” to avoid distortionary effects of such large purchases (Hammermann et
al. 2019, sec. 3).
As of February 2022, PEPP has purchased eligible assets worth EUR 1.6 trillion (ECB 2020a).
The Executive Board mostly purchased public-sector securities, some commercial paper and
corporate bonds, but very few covered bonds, and no asset-backed securities, as shown in
Figure 5 (ECB 2020b).
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Figure 5: PEPP Purchases by Asset Class

Source: ECB 2020b.

10. Source of Funding: The Eurosystem credited bank reserves to fund PEPP.
The Eurosystem funded asset purchases by expanding their central bank balance sheets.
When a central bank purchased securities under the APP, that central bank credited the
reserve account of the bank connected to that particular security; following Decision
2020/440, the same applied to PEPP purchases (ECB 2017).9 The ECB only purchased 10%
of public-sector securities that were purchased under the program; NCBs purchased the
remainder of the debt of their respective member state (ECB/2020/9 2020, art. 6).
The Governing Council committed Eurosystem central banks to reinvest the principal from
maturing PEPP securities (ECB 2021f). The Eurosystem shared all risks of private-sectorsecurities defaults, and 20% of public-sector-securities defaults (ECB, n.d.). This meant that
The Eurosystem used banks’ reserve accounts as settlement services for PEPP transactions even if the seller
of a security was not a bank with a Eurosystem reserve account holder. In such a case, the central bank would
credit a bank at which the seller held an account (ECB 2017). In such a way, a bank could be connected to a
security without selling it.
9
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if these securities bore losses, all losses of private-sector securities would be divided among
the Eurosystem central banks according to the Eurosystem capital key, while only losses
from 20% of public-sector purchases would be divided.
11. Eligible Institutions: The PEPP purchased from institutions eligible for monetary
policy operations and investment managers entrusted with Eurosystem centralbank portfolios.
Eligibility criteria for PEPP counterparties were set by earlier decisions establishing the APP
and its component programs. All programs could transact with institutions eligible for
monetary policy operations and investment managers entrusted with Eurosystem central
bank portfolios (ECB/2014/45 2015, art. 4; ECB/2016/16 2016, art. 6; ECB/2020/8 2020,
art. 4; ECB/2020/9 2020, art. 7). The Governing Council could also designate other entities
for outright transactions under the ABSPP after the ECB conducted a counterparty-risk
assessment (ECB/2014/45 2015, art. 4). Institutions were eligible for monetary policy
operations if they were subject to reserve requirements, were financially sound, were
subject to supervision by an EU or European Economic Area authority, and if they fulfilled
any requirements unique to the NCB with which they sought to transact (ECB 2006, chap.
2.1).
In all, Eurosystem central banks sought a large number of counterparties (the APP had used
more than 350; Hammermann et al. 2019, sec. 3). Avdjiev, Everett, and Shin (2019) reported
that investors outside the eurozone, and largely in the United Kingdom, were responsible for
half of APP sales. Spreading purchases over time reduced distortions on bond-market
segments and made it easier to reach hard-to-reach market segments (Hammermann et al.
2019, sec. 3).
12. Auction or Standing Facility: Most purchases used standing facilities; four NCBs
used reverse auctions to purchase public-sector securities.
National central banks seemed to follow their existing asset-purchase procedures for
implementing the PEPP (ECB/2020/17 2020, preamble). The majority of APP purchases saw
sellers access a standing facility at their designated NCB.10 These facilities engaged in
bilateral trades, whereby the NCB took the best price quoted by its counterparties in phone
calls and over electronic trading platforms. Bilateral trading allowed NCBs to handle the
“liquidity and heterogeneity” of the various eurozone jurisdictions (Hammermann et al.
2019, box 1).
Banque de France, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), and Lietuvos Bankas first trialed reverse
auctions for the PSPP in 2015 alongside their standing facilities (Hammermann et al. 2019,
box 1). In 2016, the Central Bank of Malta began conducting reverse auctions of public-sector

A country’s designated NCB was not always the NCB based in it. Designated NCBs varied for corporate debt
and asset-backed securities, as shown in
10

Figure 6. NCBs purchased public-sector securities and covered bonds for their home country.
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securities (ECB 2021a). The Eurosystem endorsed their usage in illiquid bond markets,
where bilateral trading risked mispricing assets.
DNB explained its auction process in detail on its website. It conducted variable-rate reverse
auctions for Dutch securities issued on the secondary market. It announced auctions via
Bloomberg two days before an operation. In an announcement, it listed which securities
were eligible for the upcoming auction and offered the option to transact bilaterally with
dealers for securities not specified by the DNB. During auctions, each counterparty had 20
minutes to submit via Bloomberg up to five pairs of amounts and prices per the security’s
ISIN, a unique identifier. DNB allocated purchases by ranking offers against “a theoretical
yield curve.” Settlement occurred two days after (DNB 2020).
13. Loan or Purchase: The Eurosystem used the same purchasing frameworks that the
APP used.
Implementation of the PEPP was decentralized and followed existing APP procedures
(ECB/2020/17 2020, preamble). This meant that the ECB and each of the 19 NCBs could use
different systems and processes to purchase eligible securities. However, per the APP
frameworks, not every central bank purchased every security. The whole Eurosystem
purchased public-sector securities, but only six NCBs purchased corporate debt, and only
four purchased asset-backed securities. Per the CSPP, Nationale Bank van Belgie, Deutsche
Bundesbank, Banco de España, Finlands Bank, Banque de France, and Banca d’Italia
purchased corporate debt on behalf of the eurozone (ECB 2021d). Five of these six also
purchased asset-backed securities—DNB substituted for Finlands Bank—as shown in
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Figure 6 (ECB 2021c).
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Figure 6: Purchasing Jurisdictions for the CSPP and ABSPP
National central bank (NCB)

Jurisdictions for which the Jurisdictions for which the
NCB purchased under CSPP
NCB purchased under ABSPP

National Bank van Belgie

Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Belgium
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal,
the Netherlands, Slovenia,
Slovakia

Deutsche Bundesbank

Germany, the Netherlands

Germany

Banco de España

Spain, the Netherlands

Spain

Banque de France

France

Finland,
France,
Ireland,
Luxembourg, Portugal

Banca d’Italia

Italy and the Netherlands

Italy

Finlands Bank

Austria, Estonia, Finland, N/A
Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia

De Nederlandsche Bank

N/A

the Netherlands

Note: Deutsche Bundesbank, Banco de España, and Banca d’Italia purchased securities from Dutch issuers but
with, respectively, Germany, Spain, and Italy as the country of risk. Nationale Bank van Belgie purchased securities
from Dutch issuers with any other country of risk.
Source: ECB 2021c; ECB 2021d.

The APP prohibition on purchasing newly issued public sector securities on the primary
market also applied to the PEPP (ECB/2020/9 2020, art. 4; ECB/2016/16 2016, art. 1).
These rules sought to ensure central banks did not engage in monetary financing, which was
prohibited by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ([1957] 2012, art. 123).
The private-sector programs could purchase in both the primary and secondary market
(Hammermann et al. 2019, box 1).
14. Eligible Assets: PEPP eligibility expanded slightly from the set of assets eligible for
the APP, which accepted assets eligible as collateral in the Eurosystem.
Under the PEPP, the Eurosystem purchased securities eligible for the APP programs: CSPP,
CBPP3, ABSPP, and PSPP (ECB/2020/17 2020, art. 1). The CSPP included commercial paper
issued by non-financial corporations—a small but growing portion of the market—with
maturities as short as 28 days (de Guindos and Schnabel 2020). All other PEPP securities
required remaining maturities of at least 70 days and no longer than 30 years and 364 days,
which was the same maximum remaining maturity as the PSPP and CSPP used
(ECB/2020/17 2020, art.2; ECB/2020/9 2020, art. 3.3; ECB/2016/16 2016, art. 2.2).
Previously, the CSPP had only accepted commercial paper with maturities as low as six
months (de Guindos and Schnabel 2020). The ECB maintained that the halted issuance of
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commercial paper and the heightened yields of outstanding commercial paper motivated
their decision to expand the eligibility to shorter term commercial paper in PEPP (de
Guindos and Schnabel 2020). Previously, the PSPP accepted remaining maturities with as
little as one year. Neither the ABSPP nor the CBPP3 specified minimum or maximum
remaining maturities.
The ECB set eligibility criteria according to both issuer and asset class, as shown in
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Figure 7. The ECB established eligibility criteria to target issuers of covered bonds and assetbacked securities, and non-financial corporations. In the PSPP, the ECB accepted debt issued
by eurozone nongovernmental organizations such as multilateral development banks and
international financial institutions (ECB/2020/9 2020, art. 3[1]). This provision expanded
the list of eligible issuers to include the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Paris Club,
and United Nations.
In addition, to be eligible for the CSPP, CBPP3, and ABSPP, securities must have been eligible
as collateral in Eurosystem refinancing operations11 (ECB 2021c; ECB 2021d; ECB 2020d).
The Eurosystem refinancing eligibility requirements for collateral were generally the same,
if not more relaxed, than those set out in the APP and PEPP legislation.

11

All public-sector securities reaching Credit Quality Step 3 were eligible for monetary policy operations.

1587

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 2

Figure 7: Eligibility Criteria for Assets
Criterion
Target
asset class
Target
issuer or
guarantor

Credit
standard
Currency
Residency
standard

PSPP
Public-sector
securities
Central, local,
and regional
governments;
international
financial
institutions

CBPP
Covered bonds
and multi-cédula
Organizations
whose purpose
does not include
to divest or shut
down

ABSPP
Asset-backed
securities
Asset-backed
securities

At least Credit Quality Step 3 from ECAIi
EUR
Issuer and
95%+ assets in

Issuer in eurozone

CSPP
Corporate bonds and
commercial paper
Organizations that
are
not:
credit
institutions,
supervised by EBA
or ECB, investment
firms,
assetmanagers, or issuers
of
securitized
instruments
Rated by ECAIi
Issuer & parent in
eurozone

eurozone

Fit for
collateral?

Not required

Yes

Note: i: External Credit Assessment Institutions, as defined by the ECB.
Sources: ECB/2014/45 2015; ECB/2016/16 2016; ECB/2020/8 2020; ECB/2020/9 2020, 039:188; ECB/2020/17
2020; ECB 2021d.

15. Eligible Assets: The PEPP waived credit-quality requirements on Greek debt.
One clear difference from APP was that the PEPP also made sovereign debt from Greece
eligible (ECB/2020/17 2020, art. 3). The establishing legislation said that, because the ECB
had a better picture of Greece’s situation, it could more closely monitor conditions there for
any negative effects on the rest of the eurozone. Greece had been subject to “enhanced
surveillance” by the ECB due to domestic financial crises in the early 2010s (ECB/2020/17
2020, preamble). Controversy had surrounded Greek debt since 2010, when the country
sought the first of three bailouts from international creditors, and its credit rating fell below
Step 3 of the EU’s Credit Quality Scale (Greece Credit Ratings, n.d.; C/2016/6447 2016; see
Appendix 1 for the full credit scale; see Runkel 2022a).
In March 2020, Greek government bonds still did not meet the PSPP’s credit quality
requirements; its long-term Fitch rating of BB lay in Credit Quality Step 4 (Fitch Ratings, n.d.).
For this reason, the PSPP did not admit Greek debt (ECB/2020/9 2020, art. 3). But the ECB
waived the credit-rating requirements for debt issued by Greece, citing the pandemic’s
effects on Greek financial markets, knock-on effects of a Greek default, and the ECB’s ability
to judge the situation due to its extraordinary involvement in the Greek economy
(ECB/2020/17 2020). However, the decision may instead have had more to do with fears
about the pandemic’s effects on Greece than with Greece’s effects on the eurozone. Before
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the COVID-19 pandemic, the ECB had carved out similar exemptions allowing banks to post
Greek debt as collateral in refinancing operations (see Runkel 2022a).
16. Loan Amounts: The PEPP followed purchase limits from the APP, except for that
of the PSPP.
Following the ABSPP, the PEPP could not purchase more than 70% of a tranche of assetbacked securities, as marked by its International Securities Identification Number (ISIN)
(ECB/2014/45 2015, art. 5). Following the CSPP, the PEPP could not purchase more than
70% of any ISIN for corporate bonds, not including public-sector corporate bonds
(ECB/2016/16 2016, art. 4). Following the CBPP3, the PEPP could not purchase securities
that—when pooled with CBPP1 and CBPP2 holdings—amounted to more than 70% of an
ISIN (ECB/2020/8 2020, art. 3).
In the PSPP, ECB decisions restricted the amount of any one security that a national central
bank could purchase to 33% of a single issue by a country subject to an economic adjustment
program administered by the ECB, or 50% of a single issuance by a multilateral development
bank or international financial institution. Moreover, purchases followed the ECB’s capital
key, placing strict ratios on the amount that the Eurosystem could purchase of one member
state’s debt relative to purchases of another member state’s debt (ECB/2020/9 2020, art. 6).
These regulations limited the ECB’s ability to narrow spreads between sovereign debt issued
by lower-rated countries and perpetually high-rated German debt.
The ECB lifted such limits in the PEPP (ECB/2020/17 2020, art. 4). The decision followed a
spike in Greek debt yields after ECB president Christine Lagarde (2020) said, in response to
a journalist’s question, that the Governing Council “are not here to close spreads,” which “is
not the function or the mission of the ECB.”
Purchases of public-sector securities were guided—but not constrained—by the relative
sizes of eurozone economies, codified in the Eurosystem capital key.12 This meant that the
ratio of one NCB’s sovereign-debt purchases to total PEPP sovereign-debt purchases could
vary during the program so long as the ratios converged to the capital-key percentages by
the program’s end date. In theory, the Bank of Greece could purchase the total amount of
sovereign debt authorized in early stages of the PEPP so long as its percentage of total publicsector purchases returned to 2.47% by the end of the PEPP. The APP, by contrast, required
national central banks to conduct purchases in step with the capital key. Continuing with the
example, when the ECB raised the amount authorized under the APP, the Bank of Greece
would purchase 2.47% of the increased amount. The lifting of these restrictions—that
purchases be made in step with the capital key and that the PEPP could purchase no more
than 33% of a single member state’s issue—stoked fears that the PEPP would prop up
fledgling member states (Arnold and Stubbington 2020).

This schedule listed the amount of ECB capital held by eurozone national central banks as a percentage of
the total capital held by eurozone national central banks. It is easily confused with the ECB capital key, which
listed the amount of ECB capital held by eurozone national central banks plus the amount held by EU national
central banks that did not use the euro.
12
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In addition, eurozone members had issued large amounts of sovereign debt during COVID19. An ECB official argued that the PEPP’s flexibility allowed it to stabilize markets when
countries issued large amounts of debt (Lane 2020a). Lagarde (2020b) asserted that
the capital keys are the benchmarks. Flexibility is the key principle that distinguishes
the PEPP from the others. We will never let capital key convergence that will take place
at some stage impair the efficiency of the monetary policy that we have to deploy.
Through January 2022, purchases from most eurozone members aligned closely with the
ratios prescribed by the capital key. Figure 8 shows how far member states strayed from the
capital key by subtracting the capital-key percentage from the percentage of cumulative
PEPP purchases of that member’s debt. Purchases of most issuers’ debt stayed within a
percentage point throughout the PEPP, but purchases of France and Italy diverged from
specified ratios by more than four percentage points in 2020.13 By 2022, purchases of French
and Italian debt were converging on the Eurosystem capital key.
Figure 8: Difference Between PEPP Proportions and Capital-Key Proportions

Source: ECB 2020c.

In July 2020, one percentage point of cumulative PSPP purchases equaled EUR 3.6 billion; in January 2022,
one percentage point equaled EUR 14.6 billion (ECB 2020c).
13
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17. Haircuts: As an asset-purchase program, the PEPP did not feature haircuts.
No haircuts were applied because the PEPP did not engage in lending.
18. Interest Rates: As an asset-purchase program, the PEPP did not specify interest
rates.
The PEPP did not specify interest rates because it did not engage in lending.
19. Fees: The ECB did not charge securities issuers any fees.
No documents suggest that the ECB charged fees to issuers of securities that it purchased.
20. Term/Repayment: As an asset-purchase program, the PEPP did not change the
term of securities it purchased.
No documents suggest that the ECB changed the terms of securities that it purchased.
21. Other Restrictions on Eligible Participants: The ECB did not impose other
conditions on counterparties.
Documents do not indicate other conditions beyond those discussed elsewhere in the case.
22. Regulatory Relief: The Eurosystem did not offer sellers regulatory relief.
Documents surveyed do not suggest that the Eurosystem provided regulatory relief—
beyond that already described in the case—to financial institutions participating in the PEPP.
23. International Coordination: The PEPP did not coordinate beyond the Eurosystem.
The Eurosystem consisted of the ECB and 19 NCBs. Coordination within the Eurosystem was
regulated by the Governing Council of the ECB and its guidelines (ECB 2006). The
Eurosystem did not coordinate with other governments inside or outside of the EU.
24. Duration: The PEPP continued purchases until at least March 2022.
As of August 2021, the ECB continued to purchase securities through the PEPP. It originally
projected to complete purchases by June 2021, with maturing principal reinvested until the
end of 2022 (ECB 2020f). The ECB followed this decision by increasing the envelope size in
response to subsequent outbreaks of COVID-19 and its variants. The ECB also extended the
timeframe for PEPP purchases “until at least the end of March 2022 and, in any case, until it
judge[d] that the coronavirus crisis phase [wa]s over” (ECB 2021f). To meet the new EUR
1.85 trillion authority, the Governing Council decided to accelerate asset purchases. The
Governing Council committed to reinvest principal from its maturing securities until at least
the end of 2023.
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Appendix A
European Banking Authority credit ratings
Credit quality step

1

2
3
ARC Ratings SA
Medium and Long- AAASF to AABBB+SF to
A+SF to A-SF
Term Issues
SF
BBB-SF
Short-Term Issues A-1+SF, A-1SF

A-2SF

A-3SF

4

All other

BB+SF to BB- Below BBSF
SF
Below A3SF

Axesor SA
Structured finance AAA(sf) to A+(sf) to A- BBB+(sf) to
BB+(sf) to Below BBrating scale
AA-(sf)
(sf)
BBB-(sf)
BB-(sf)
(sf)
Creditreform Ratings AG
Long-term rating
BBB+ sf to BB+ sf to BB- Below BBAAA sf, AA- sf A+ sf to A- sf
scale
BBB- sf
sf
sf
DBRS Ratings Limited
A (high) (sf) BBB (high) (sf) BB (high) (sf)
Long-term obligations AAA (sf) to
Below BB
to A (low) to BBB (low) to BB (low)
rating scale AA (low) (sf)
(low) (sf)
(sf)
(sf)
(sf)
Commercial paper and R-1 (high) (sf) R-2 (high)
Below R-3
short-term debt rating to R-1 (low) (sf) to R-2
R-3 (sf)
(sf)
scale
(sf)
(low) (sf)
FERI EuroRating Services AG
AAAsf to AABBB+sf to BBB- BB+sf to BB- Below BBRating scale
A+sf to A-sf
sf
sf
sf
sf
Fitch Ratings
Long-term issuer AAAsf to AABBB+sf to BBB- BB+sf to BB- Below BBA+sf to A-sf
credit ratings scale
sf
sf
sf
sf
Short-term rating
Below
F1+sf, F1sf
F2sf
F3sf
scale
F3sf
Japan Credit Rating Agency Ltd
Long-term issuer
AAA to AAA+ to ABBB+ to BBB- BB+ to BB- Below BBratings scale
Short-term issuer
J-1+, J-1
J-2
J-3
Below J-3
ratings scale
Kroll Bond Rating Agency
AAA (sf) to A+ (sf) to A- BBB+ (sf) to BB+ (sf) to Below BBLong-Term Credit
AA- (sf)
(sf)
BBB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
(sf)
K1+ (sf), K1
Below K3
Short-Term Credit
K2 (sf)
K3 (sf)
(sf)
(sf)
Moody's Investors Service
Global long-term Aaa(sf) to
A1(sf) to
Baa1(sf) to
Ba1(sf) to
Below
rating scale
Aa3(sf)
A3(sf)
Baa3(sf)
Ba3(sf)
Ba3(sf)
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P-1(sf)

P-2(sf)

P-3(sf)

NP(sf)

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services
Long-term issuer AAA (sf) to A+ (sf) to A- BBB+ (sf) to BB+ (sf) to Below BBcredit ratings scale
AA- (sf)
(sf)
BBB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
(sf)
Short-term issuer A-1+ (sf),
Below A-3
A-2 (sf)
A-3 (sf)
credit ratings scale
A-1 (sf)
(sf)
Scope Rating AG
Global long-term AAASF to AABBB+SF to BB+SF to BB- Below BBA+SF to A-SF
rating scale
SF
BBB-SF
SF
SF
Global short-term
S-1+SF, S-1SF
S-2SF
S-3SF
S-4SF
rating scale
Source: C/2016/6447 2016.
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